

Jurgen Habermas Religion and Public Affairs

Abstract

Despite Jurgen Habermas's defense of political liberalism, he sees that, in its ultra-secular form, it can not answer questions such as: How does the secular public sphere depend on fair procedures that guide public circulation while restricting the participation of citizens and not leaving open the door to other types of Justifications, especially the religious reasonable Justifications? How can we expect all citizens to justify their political decisions independently of their convictions or religious views? How does the separation between religion and public affairs negatively affect the permitted role of religious traditions, communities and organizations in the general political sphere and in the voluntary formation of citizens themselves? How does a religious citizen suffer under political liberalism from his identity split between being a citizen and being religious? Is the burden of citizenship distributed fairly between the two parties: secular and religious?

To answer these questions and for a more open and less fundamental version of political liberalism, Habermas redefines the line between religion and public affairs. This study seeks to provide a critical analysis of Habermas' views on the role of religion and religious people in public affairs by adopting a comparative analysis methodology and comparative study of his ideas.

Habermas calls for giving a new status to religion, so that the secular society is closer to the complex phenomenon that assumes the presence of two parties, secular and religious. Secularism is thus an "integrative path" between the two parties. He believes that it is in the interest of the modern constitutional state to take into account all the sources or cultural springs that nourish solidarity among people and promote their awareness of values. Therefore, believers and laity in the modern constitutional state should deal with mutual respect. The philosophical basis of that relationship is the principle of incompatibility between science and faith as one of the principles of a secular state. But this principle

finds no reasonable translation, according to Habermas, only when religious convictions are recognized as a different epistemological nature, and to cease being rational. The firm rationalization of secularism does not prevent openness to new horizons.